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This study addresses an important shortcoming of most of the existing literature on credit 
availability by including a set of unlisted firms (which are the firms most likely to be bank 
dependent) in the analysis, and by investigating differences between the treatment of listed and 
unlisted firms by their lenders. We find evidence consistent with evergreening behavior by banks 
toward listed firms, consistent with prior studies. However, the more striking result is that banks 
appear to treat the smaller, unlisted firms differently, being much less willing to engage in 
evergreening behavior for these borrowers. The difference in treatment of unlisted firms relative 
to listed firms does not appear to be related to systematic differences in size between the two 
groups of firms. Thus, it appears that the distinguishing characteristic that determines whether a 
bank might evergreen loans to a firm is whether or not the firm is listed. Furthermore, this effect 
appears to be stronger for those firms listed on the more prestigious Tokyo Stock Exchange 
compared to firms listed on other exchanges; that is, being on the list (being listed) matters, and 
being on the A-list matters even more. Moreover, among listed firms, for which data on 
ownership by banks are available, a higher concentration of ownership of the firm by either the 
main bank or the firm’s top three lenders increases the likelihood of the firm obtaining increased 
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1.  Introduction 
 It is well established that Japanese banks provided support to listed firms during the 
extended period of economic malaise in Japan following the bursting of the stock market and 
real estate bubbles (for example, Peek and Rosengren 2005; Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashap 2008). 
In particular, the weaker was a bank’s health, the more likely it was to increase lending to the 
weakest Japanese firms, in large part due to the perverse incentives banks faced to avoid having 
to recognize an even greater quantity of problem loans. While keeping these zombie firms alive 
through evergreening loans, as well as through debt forgiveness and debt-for-equity swaps, may 
have avoided the mutually assured destruction of the banks and their borrowers, such behavior 
likely contributed to lengthening the period of economic malaise in Japan, commonly referred to 
as the “Lost Decade.” Bank regulators were complicit in allowing such bank behavior, 
permitting banks to overstate their capital and understate their problem loans, in part to avoid the 
high costs that would be associated with widespread bank failures and a massive increase in 
unemployment if many large firms were pushed into bankruptcy.  
 While the existing literature does provide strong evidence of evergreening behavior by 
banks, this evidence has been produced primarily for listed firms, omitting precisely the set of 
smaller, unlisted firms most likely to be “bank dependent,” and thus most affected by credit 
availability during a banking crisis. This study investigates the extent to which banks treated 
unlisted firms differently than listed firms in terms of their willingness to make credit available, 
and whether the loans supplied were based on the fundamentals of healthy firms or on 
evergreening loans to unhealthy firms. A number of possible explanations exist for differential 
treatment of listed and unlisted firms. For example, banks may have been more willing to 
provide credit to unhealthy listed firms due to government pressure to support large troubled 
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firms to avoid a massive increase in unemployment, pressure from the government and the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange to avoid the embarrassment of large numbers of listed firm failures, 
same-keiretsu affiliations between the main bank and the firm, or simply that the banks had a 
larger exposure to the large firms so that the failure of a large firm would have adversely 
impacted the reported problem loans and capital of the banks by more than the failure of a 
number of small firms. Thus, pressure or incentives to treat listed firms differently than smaller 
firms may have been based on external factors or on factors internal to the banks.   
 In fact, given the persistent weak economic performance experienced in Japan following 
the bursting of the stock market and real estate bubbles, the relatively few bankruptcies of listed 
Japanese firms is quite striking (Hoshi and Kashyap 2001; Hamao, Mei, and Xu 2004). However, 
such a pattern would be consistent with banks supporting the largest firms. In sharp contrast, 
large numbers of bankruptcies of small and mid-sized Japanese firms (SMEs) occurred 
throughout the period of economic malaise, even in the face of exhortations by the government 
for banks to increase lending to SMEs. For example, based on data reported by the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Agency (2003) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
(2010), the bankruptcy rate for firms with paid-in capital of less than 100 million yen was 1.77 
percent in 1996, compared to only 0.09 percent for listed firms. Although bankruptcy rates were 
higher in 2001, the relative comparison is similar:  2.33 percent for firms with paid-in capital of 
less than 100 million yen compared to only 0.32 percent for listed firms. 
Thus, an important question concerns why the bankruptcy experience of SMEs contrasted 
so sharply with that of listed firms during this period. To what extent can the disparity be 
attributed to differences in the fundamentals of the two groups of firms, and to what extent can it 
be attributed to a difference in the treatment of the firms by their lenders? Was the evergreening 
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of loans limited to the largest firms to which the banks had the largest exposure? And, if so, were 
lending decisions for SMEs based on their fundamentals, or were SMEs subjected to a credit 
crunch as banks used their limited lending capacity to meet the loan demand from listed firms? 
 The extended period of economic malaise, in combination with the banking crisis, that 
followed the bursting of the stock market and real estate bubbles in Japan at the beginning of the 
1990s is particularly relevant for a study of bank credit availability that attempts to distinguish 
between the experiences and treatment of unlisted firms compared to listed firms. Moreover, the 
general conclusions from previous studies that the evergreening of loans to unhealthy Japanese 
listed firms was widespread and that some relatively healthy Japanese firms may have faced a 
credit crunch suggest that including the smaller unlisted, and primarily bank-dependent, firms is 
essential for obtaining a better understanding of how, and to whom, bank credit was provided 
during this troubled period.   
 We find evidence consistent with evergreening behavior by banks toward listed firms, 
consistent with prior studies. However, the more striking result is that banks appear to treat the 
smaller, unlisted firms differently, being much less willing to engage in evergreening behavior 
toward these borrowers. And, it is not simply a matter of firm size: these results remain even 
after controlling for differences in firm size. Thus, it appears that being a listed firm matters. Yet 
even among listed firms, banks appear to show even more favoritism toward firms listed on the 
premier stock exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, than to those listed on other exchanges; that 
is, being on the list matters, and being on the A-list matters even more. Moreover, among listed 
firms, for which data on ownership by banks are available, a higher concentration of ownership 
of the firm by either the main bank or the firm’s top three lenders increases the likelihood of the 
firm obtaining increased loans.   
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 The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we provide some background and 
summarize previous studies.  Section 3 describes the data and sample characteristics, and Section 
4 discusses the empirical specification.  Sections 5 and 6 present empirical results, and Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2.  Background  
 Most firms rely on credit in order to finance their operations. As Figure 1 shows, 
Japanese firms fit this pattern, although the degree of reliance on debt has varied across size 
classes of firms and over time. While all four size classes of firms (Micro, Small, Medium, and 
Large) had debt-to-asset ratios in the range of 85 to 90 percent in the mid-1970s, large firms have 
steadily delevered since that time.1
While many larger firms have direct access to credit markets, most firms are too small, or 
too opaque, to directly access credit markets (e.g., bond and commercial paper markets). Such 
firms tend to rely more heavily on intermediated credit, with most of that credit being provided 
by banks. Because these firms rely on banks for their borrowing, they are often deemed to be 
 On the other hand, medium-sized firms began to delever only 
in the mid-1990s, although at a faster rate than was the case for large firms. After a brief surge in 
the late 1990s, small firms similarly began to delever, following a path close to that of medium-
sized firms. In contrast, not only did micro firms resist this pattern of declining leverage, they 
actually increased the level of their debt-to-asset ratio in the mid-1990s and have essentially 
maintained that higher leverage ratio.   
                                                          
1 The data are from the Policy Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance.  The four size classes are defined by the 
size of the paid-in capital of the firm. Micro firms are defined as firms with less than 10 million yen of paid-in 
capital; small firms are defined as firms with 10-100 million yen of paid-in capital; medium firms are defined as 
firms with 100 million-1 billion yen of paid-in capital; large firms are defined as firms with more than 1 billion yen 
of paid-in capital. 
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“bank dependent.” Moreover, the relative reliance on bank loans should be particularly important 
in a country such as Japan that is typically considered to have a bank-centered, rather than 
market-centered, economy.  
Figure 2 shows the ratios of borrowings from financial institutions (bank loans) to total 
debt for the same four size classes of Japanese firms. As would be expected, smaller firms tend 
to rely more heavily on bank loans than do large firms. Interestingly, the bank loans-to-debt ratio 
for large firms is actually higher than for other firms until the early 1980s when the Japanese 
bond market began to be deregulated. Strikingly, the large firm relative reliance on bank loans 
declines even as these firms steadily delever (as shown in Figure 1) until the recent rebound in 
this ratio. While these large firms were reducing their reliance on bank loans, the other three size 
classes of firms were increasing their relative reliance on bank loans into the mid-1990s, after 
which the relative importance of bank loans in total debt declined. However, the decline in the 
bank loans-to-debt ratio for medium-sized firms was much sharper, with the ratio eventually 
falling to the level of that for large firms and then mirroring the rebound in the ratio for large 
firms in the last half of the 2000s. Although the bank loans-to-debt ratio for small and micro 
firms did not decline to the same degree as that for medium firms, the ratios similarly exhibit a 
temporary rebound at the end of the sample period.  
Because bank credit is such an important source of credit for most firms in Japan, it is 
important to understand under what criteria, and to whom, bank credit is provided. Figures 1 and 
2 show that the relative importance of bank loans, both across firm size classes and over time, 
has changed substantially, suggesting that meaningful changes in either the demand for bank 
loans or the willingness of banks to make credit available to different classes of firms has 
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occurred. Our primary focus will be on the relative willingness of banks to provide credit to 
listed firms compared to unlisted firms, controlling for loan demand. 
 Most firm-level studies that investigate the provision of bank credit rely on databases that 
include only listed firms, omitting precisely those firms most likely to be bank dependent. This 
occurs because balance sheet and income data for listed firms are widely available, while the 
availability of those data for unlisted firms is quite limited. While we can improve our 
understanding of the allocation of credit through studies of listed firms, we do not know that the 
supply of credit to, or the demand for credit by, smaller, unlisted firms follows the same patterns 
as those for the larger, listed firms that are more transparent and have better access to nonbank 
sources of credit through national or international markets. Moreover, any differences may be 
magnified in times of financial stress, when credit markets may not function as well as in more 
normal times, the willingness to take on risk exposure may be reduced, bank and/or firm health 
deteriorates, and market signals become less clear as opacity increases.  
 For listed Japanese firms, substantial evidence exists that Japanese banks continued to 
lend to unhealthy firms during the crisis period. For example, Peek and Rosengren (2005), 
Caballero et al. (2008), Ahearne and Shinada (2005), and Sekine, Kobayashi, and  Saita (2003) 
each find that bank credit was allocated to relatively unhealthy firms, suggesting that the banking 
system misallocated credit, and that this misallocation likely extended the length of the period of 
economic malaise experienced by the Japanese economy. Peek and Rosengren (2005) emphasize 
the perverse incentives faced by troubled banks to continue allocating credit to many of their 
weakest borrowers in order to avoid “mutually assured destruction.” Because troubled banks 
needed to continue the fiction that they were adequately capitalized, they wanted to avoid 
reporting further increases in nonperforming loans that would require them to charge off existing 
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loans and add to their loan loss reserves, actions that would reduce their reported capital ratios. 
In order to do so, they tried to prevent or delay their troubled borrowers from being declared 
bankrupt, which would force the banks to recognize their loans to those firms as problem loans.   
One mechanism for doing so is “evergreening” loans, whereby a bank makes additional 
loans to a troubled firm that can be used to repay interest on the firm’s existing loans. By 
providing the funds to the firm needed for interest payments, the already outstanding loans 
would not go into default, and thus the lender would not be forced to recognize them as 
nonperforming loans. Of course, bank regulators would have to be complicit in perpetuating the 
fiction that such loans were current and that the banks did not need to charge off at least part of 
the loans and add to their loan loss reserves. In fact, using aggregate data, Hosono and 
Sakuragawa (2003) argue that the discretionary enforcement of minimum capital requirements 
by bank supervisors was a key determinant of forbearance lending by Japanese banks. 
 Using detailed data on loans from individual banks to individual listed firms, Peek and 
Rosengren (2005) show that troubled banks with reported capital ratios close to the required 
minimum value were more likely to increase loans to their weakest borrowers. Moreover, they 
find that this misallocation of credit was enhanced by corporate affiliations; that is, if a bank was 
in the same keiretsu as the firm, it was more likely to increase loans to a weak firm. On the other 
hand, the misallocation of credit was less prevalent for nonbank lenders compared to banks. 
Focusing on the debt-to-asset ratio, Sekine et al. (2003) find similar evidence of forbearance 
lending to nonmanufacturing firms, especially in particularly troubled industries such as real 
estate and construction, adversely impacting bank profitability. While the extensive 
misallocation of credit may have prevented widespread bankruptcies of listed firms, it also likely 
impaired the creative destruction that would have contributed to the restructuring of troubled 
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firms and the reallocation of resources to more productive uses necessary for the Japanese 
economy to have a sustained recovery.  
 In fact, Caballero et al. (2008) focus on how this forbearance lending to otherwise 
insolvent borrowers interfered with the restructuring of troubled firms necessary for the recovery 
of the Japanese economy. Moreover, not only did this forbearance lending allow “zombie” firms 
to continue to operate, but their continued operations had an adverse effect on healthier firms by 
distorting competition. The reduced profitability of firms forced to compete with these zombie 
firms discouraged the non-zombie firms from investing, as well as deterring entry of new 
competitors, further weakening any potential recovery of the Japanese economy. In fact, Ahearne 
and Shinada (2005) find similar evidence that industries with a concentration of zombie firms 
tended to have lower productivity growth rates, in part because forbearance lending aided weak 
firms at the expense of the more productive firms in those industries, restraining the ability of the 
more productive firms to gain market share at the expense of the least productive firms. 
 A small number of studies have provided similar evidence of the inefficient allocation of 
credit for smaller, unlisted firms during the crisis period. For example, Nishimura, Nakajima, and 
Kiyota (2005) find that relatively inefficient firms, based on total factor productivity, tended to 
survive during the crisis, while relatively efficient firms were exiting. This pattern was 
particularly apparent for recent entrants. Such evidence strongly suggests that Japanese banks 
were not allocating credit efficiently during the crisis. Uesugi (2008) finds a similar pattern 
among manufacturing firms for voluntary exits not necessarily related to financial problems, 
insofar as relatively efficient firms voluntarily exited while relatively inefficient firms continued 
to operate. However, Uesugi (2008) finds that bank lending to SMEs, unlike that to large firms, 
appears to operate efficiently rather than being based on forbearance lending, perhaps because 
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loans to distressed small firms are too small to be renegotiated. Of course, to the extent that the 
loans to distressed SMEs have been guaranteed by the government, banks have no incentive to 
pursue forbearance policies, instead simply collecting on the distressed loans from the 
government guarantor. This suggests that bank behavior toward unlisted firms may be quite 
different from that toward listed firms. 
 
3.  Data 
 Our database covers the period from 1993 to 2005, and contains annual data for both 
unlisted and listed firms in Japan. The unlisted firm data are primarily from Teikoku Databank, a 
credit research firm. The original Teikoku database contains over 500,000 unlisted firms, from 
large firms to small proprietorship businesses. From this extensive database, we obtained annual 
balance sheet and income statement data for firms with paid-in capital exceeding 80 million yen 
after 1993. We excluded 100 percent parent-owned subsidiaries, cooperatives, public utilities and 
financial firms. We also required that the firm report data for at least five consecutive years 
during our sample period.   
 We supplement these data with data for unlisted firms contained in Nikkei Financial 
QUEST, although if an unlisted firm appears in both databases, we use the Teikoku data. 2
                                                          
2 The Nikkei database includes unlisted firms that are required to file with the Ministry of Finance. Firms having 
more than 1,000 shareholders (except for firms with less than 500 million yen of paid-in capital) are required to file. 
Both balance sheet and income statement data items are comparable to those for listed firms that are required to file 
with the Ministry of Finance. We cross-checked the data for these firms across the two databases for accuracy and 
found no significant differences.  
 
Although the statements of the unlisted firms that do not file with the Ministry of Finance are not 
audited, the integrity of reporting is assured by being members of the Teikoku credit research 
universe of firms. Teikoku's research is widely used by banks and other financial institutions for 
  
11 
their credit assessment, and the fact that a firm belongs to this database (and obtained a Teikoku 
Company Code) is considered to be passing a milestone. For listed firms, we obtained annual 
financial and attribute data for 1993 to 2005 from Nikkei Financial QUEST, which includes all 
listed firms on the Tokyo and regional exchanges (including newly established exchanges for 
new and emerging firms), and JASDAQ. As with unlisted firms, we excluded public utilities and 
financial firms. Table 1 shows the number of firms of specific types included in our regression 
sample. We divided firms into the following three categories: (1) listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange first section (TSE-1) or second section (TSE-2), (2) listed on other exchanges 
(regional exchanges, TSE MOTHERS, and JASDAQ), and (3) unlisted. The TSE, which has 
stricter listing standards than other exchanges, generally had a steady number of listed firms 
during the period, approximately 1,200 firms in a given year. The number of listed firms on other 
exchanges was also steady, at around 500. The number of firms in our unlisted firm sample was 
around 8,500 firms. The table also includes the number of firms that had IPOs. 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for our sample of listed and unlisted firms 
separately. The table is based on the useable sample for the regression analysis, which begins 
only in 1996 because the earlier available data are used in constructing the lagged values for the 
explanatory variables. As shown in Table 2, the mean (median) paid-in capital for listed firms is 
13.0 billion yen (4.4 billion yen) in 1996. In contrast, the mean (median) paid-in capital for 
unlisted firms is, as expected, much smaller, at only 423 million yen (105 million yen) in 1996. 
Similarly, the mean (median) for total assets for listed firms is 158 billion yen (43.8 billion yen) 
in 1996, but only 14.7 billion yen (5.5 billion yen) for unlisted firms. After 1996, paid-in capital 
rose and total assets declined on average for listed firms. For unlisted firms, the pattern is similar, 
with paid-in capital rising and total assets declining.  
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Table 3 contains the industry distributions for the listed and unlisted firm samples 
separately. Manufacturing firms account for 61 percent of the listed firms in 1996, but only 32 
percent of unlisted firms. In sharp contrast, the percentages of Construction and Wholesale Trade, 
Retail Trade, and Eating and Drinking Places for unlisted firms are high (18 and 33 percent) 
compared to those for listed firms (only 8 and 16 percent) in 1996. Comparing 2005 to 1996, the 
listed firm shares remain relatively stable, while the unlisted firm shares fluctuate somewhat, 
with the 4 percentage point growth in the Services share being notable.  
A main bank is designated for each firm for each year. For unlisted firms, the main bank 
is the first-named bank in the firm attributes file of the Teikoku Databank.3
                                                          
3 The set of main banks is limited to publicly traded banks for which we can calculate a market-to-book value, one 
of the control variables used in our regression analysis.  
 Because we have 
access to the identities of lenders to each listed firm from the Nikkei NEEDS loan database, we 
are able to identify the main banks for listed firms with more precision, designating the main 
bank as the lender with the largest volume of loans outstanding to the firm in each year. The 
main bank list is then smoothed to avoid instances in which a specific firm’s largest lender 
switches back and forth temporarily as new loans are made or existing loans mature. Table 4 
shows the sharp contrast between listed firms and unlisted firms in the distribution of main banks 
by bank type. For listed firms, City Banks dominate as main banks, with Long-Term Credit 
Banks initially being in second place until their importance dissipates with their failures and 
nationalizations. Regional Banks then move into second place, well ahead of Trust Banks. 
Regional Banks 2 maintain a share of 1 percent or less. For unlisted firms, City Banks also are 
the dominant bank type, although representing a much smaller share than for listed firms. 
Regional Banks represent a much larger share than for listed firms, while Regional Banks 2, 
Long-Term Credit Banks and Trust Banks maintain very small shares.   
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Figure 3 shows the patterns of bank lending during the 1990 to 2001 period for four 
different categories of banks: City Banks, Regional Banks, Regional Banks 2, and Shinkin Banks. 
The data for each year indicate total outstanding loans and discounts (including bills discounted, 
loans on bills, loans on deeds, and overdrafts) at the end of March for each fiscal year. While 
City Banks have decreased loans generally since 1993, the other three bank categories have 
tended to continue to gradually increase loans until near the end of the period shown. 
Unfortunately, the Bank of Japan provides data only for years prior to 2002. 
 
4.  Empirical Specification 
 While we do not have individual bank loan data for each unlisted firm, we do have total 
bank loans to the firm and can identify the main bank of the firm (as the first-named bank in the 
firm attributes file). Following Peek and Rosengren (2005) who examined listed firms to 
investigate the extent to which banks evergreened loans to firms, we specify an equation that 
explains the probability of a firm receiving increased loans using variables intended to measure 
firm health, other firm characteristics, main bank health, and main bank type, as well as 
additional controls for loan demand and general macroeconomic activity. However, by extending 
our sample to include unlisted firms as well as listed firms, we are able to investigate whether 
differences exist between the determinants of bank lending to unlisted firms compared to listed 
firms.   
The dependent variable used in our regression models is a (0, 1) dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one if loans to the firm increase from the prior period. This directly follows 
the Peek and Rosengren (2005) specification, recognizing that a decrease in loans or no change 
in loans provides an ambiguous signal. Loans could remain unchanged either because the firm 
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did not request additional loans or because, even though the firm did request additional loans, the 
bank denied the request. Similarly, a firm’s loans could decline through simple amortization of 
existing loans, because firms did not desire to rollover maturing loans, because banks refused to 
rollover maturing loans to the firm, or because of debt forgiveness by the banks, each of which 
has different implications for the availability of credit to the firm. We use a random effects probit 
specification rather than a fixed (firm) effects specification because a fixed effects specification 
would not allow the firm characteristics in which we are most interested, such as being unlisted, 
to be included in the regression specification. 
The basic specification is:  
PR(LOANi, t) = a0 + a1FIRMi, t-1 + a2BONDi, t-1 + a3BANKi, t-1 + a4YEARi, t + a5REGIONi, t-1  
+ a6INDUSTRYi, t-1 + ui, t-1 
 The dependent variable has a value of one if total loans to firm i from financial 
institutions increased from year t-1 to year t, and zero if total loans to the firm were unchanged 
or decreased from year t-1 to year t. The first vector of variables, FIRM, is intended to capture 
firm health and other characteristics of the firm, and we use a one-year lag for each measure in 
the regressions. UNLISTED_D, a (0, 1) dummy variable, is equal to one if the firm is unlisted, 
and equal to zero if the firm is listed. The firm’s return on assets, FROA, is measured as the 
firm’s operating income as a share of its total assets for the prior year. FROA_AV is measured as 
the average of the firm’s ROA for the current and prior year. We also consider non-continuous 
measures of FROA_AV to allow for a nonlinear effect. FROA_LOW, a (0, 1) dummy variable, 
is equal to one if the firm’s FROA_AV is in the lowest quartile among the sample firms, and 
FROA_HIGH is a (0, 1) dummy variable indicating that the firm’s FROA_AV is in the highest 
quartile. The estimated coefficients then indicate differential effects compared to the middle 50 
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percent, which serves as the benchmark. In addition, we consider dummy variables that indicate 
to which quintile the firm’s ROA belongs. These are FROA_QUI1, FROA_QUI2, FROA_QUI4, 
and FROA_QUI5. The estimated coefficients then indicate differential effects compared to the 
third quintile, which serves as the benchmark.  
In addition to these dummy variable measures for ROA, we also allow for a specific 
nonlinearity that permits a differential response when FROA_AV takes on negative values. The 
idea is that firms will try hard to avoid reporting negative earnings so that doing so may be 
particularly informative about the firm’s deteriorating health. For this specification, we add two 
variables in addition to including FROA_AV. The first is D_LOSS, a (0, 1) dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one if FROA_AV is negative and zero otherwise. The second variable is then 
the interaction term of D_LOSS with FROA_AV that allows the estimated effect of FROA_AV 
to differ when FROA_AV has a negative value from that when FROA_AV has a positive value. 
Finally, in addition to measures of ROA, we also include DIRECTION(FROA) to account for 
whether FROA is rising or falling. This variable is measured as the difference between FROA 
and FROA_AV.  
The firm’s working capital, FWORKCAP, is measured as the firm’s current (having a life 
of less than one year) assets less current liabilities, as a share of total assets. To control for 
capital structure, we consider a measure of leverage, FLEV, calculated as the value of the ratio of 
the firm’s total liabilities to the firm’s total assets. Firm size, FLASSET, is measured as the 
logarithm of the firm’s total real assets, using the Consumer Price Index as the deflator. The 
change in the firm’s real sales (using the Consumer Price Index as the price deflator) from period 
(t-1) to period t, scaled by period (t-1) real sales, FSALES, is used to control for shifts in the 
firm’s loan demand. A firm’s tangible assets, FPPE, are measured as property, plant and 
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equipment, as a share of the firm’s total assets. We interact each of these firm variables with the 
unlisted firm dummy variable to allow the effects to differ between listed firms and unlisted 
firms. 
The second set of explanatory variables, BOND, is a vector of variables intended to 
capture the bond issuing behavior of firms. Five bond issue-related (0, 1) dummy variables are 
included. BOND_D is equal to one if the firm has bonds outstanding during the prior period, and 
is equal to zero otherwise. BOND_UP_D is equal to one if the firm increased bonds outstanding 
during the prior year, and is equal to zero otherwise. BOND_DOWN_D is equal to one if the 
firm decreased bonds outstanding during the prior year, and is equal to zero otherwise. We also 
allow for differential effects when bonds outstanding increase from zero or decline all the way to 
zero. BOND_TO_ZERO is equal to one if the firm’s bonds outstanding decline to zero during 
the prior period, and is equal to zero otherwise. BOND_FROM_ZERO is equal to one if the 
firm’s bonds outstanding increase from zero during the prior period, and is equal to zero 
otherwise. Again, each of these explanatory variables is entered separately and interacted with 
the unlisted firm dummy variable to allow for differential effects on listed and unlisted firms.   
 The third set of explanatory variables, BANK, is a vector of variables intended to capture 
main bank health. The primary measure of main bank health, MBK_MB, is measured as the 
main bank’s market-to-book ratio at the end of the prior period. In addition, RECAP_D is a (0, 1) 
dummy variable, with a value of one indicating that the main bank was recapitalized during the 
prior year. Again, each of these variables is interacted with the unlisted firm dummy variable to 
allow for differential effects on listed and unlisted firms.   
The fourth set of explanatory variables, YEAR, contains a set of annual (0, 1) dummy 
variables (from 1997_D to 2005_D). These annual dummy variables capture the average effect 
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of macroeconomic conditions in each year relative to the base year of 1996. These variables also 
are interacted with the unlisted firm dummy variable to allow differential effects. 
The fifth set of explanatory variables, REGION, contains PREF_INCOME to capture the 
average effect of regional economic conditions in each year. PREF_INCOME is measured as the 
average growth rate of real income per capita during the past three years in the prefecture in 
which the firm is headquartered. We also interact this term with the unlisted dummy variable to 
allow for local economic conditions to impact lending to unlisted firms differently than to listed 
firms.   
The sixth set of explanatory variables, INDUSTRY, contains six industry dummy 
variables in order to control for any systematic differences across industries. We use a set of (0, 
1) dummy variables indicating whether a firm belongs to agriculture, forestry, fishery and 
mining (AGRI), manufacturing (MANUFA), construction (CONST), transport and 
communications (TRANS), wholesale trade, retail trade, and eating and drinking places 
(WHOLESALE),  and real estate (REALEST). The base group is the service industry. These 
variables also are interacted with the unlisted firm dummy variable. 
We also estimate the equations for some subsets of firms or sample periods, for example 
based on main bank type or firm size, allowing the slope coefficients on the explanatory 
variables to differ across subsamples. By considering specific subsets of observations, we may 
be better able to identify the extent of, and the reasons for, differences in the bank treatment of 





5.  Results 
 The dependent variable in the regression equations is a (0, 1) dummy variable that takes 
on a value of one if total loans to the firm were increased between time period (t-1) and period t, 
and zero otherwise. The equations are estimated using random effects probit techniques. While 
we have data for the 1993 to 2005 period, the regressions can be estimated only over the 1996 to 
2005 period because the prior observations are required to calculate the lagged changes in the set 
of explanatory variables. We have removed outliers, defined as those observations outside the 1 
percent tails of the distributions, for the explanatory variables measuring firm health and firm 
characteristics other than size. In removing outliers, we have considered the unlisted and listed 
firm observations as separate databases to avoid disproportionately removing either listed 
observations or unlisted observations at either extreme, given that the distribution of 
characteristics of unlisted firms may differ systematically from those of listed firms. Similarly, 
we have removed the 1 percent tails year by year rather than from the aggregated set of 
observations to avoid disproportionately removing observations from the years with the very best 
and very worst firm performances. Table 5 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in the regression analysis. 
 
5.1  Sample of Firms Always Listed or Always Unlisted 
 Table 6 contains the results for the firms in our sample that appear only as listed firms or 
only as unlisted firms. In later specifications, we also include IPO firms in our sample that switch 
from being unlisted to being listed.4
                                                          
4 We do not include delisted firms because of the few such observations present. 
 The first column indicates that, for listed firms, the return on 
assets has a negative effect, suggesting that worse performing firms were more likely to obtain 
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an increase in loans, consistent with banks evergreening loans to the weakest firms. Moreover, 
the negative estimated coefficient on the direction of the change in firm ROA indicates that listed 
firms with declining ROA performance were even more likely to obtain increased bank loans, 
again consistent with evergreening behavior by banks toward listed firms. Firms with more 
working capital were less likely to obtain an increase in loans, perhaps reflecting less need for 
additional loans, and thus a lower demand for loans by these firms. The negative estimated effect 
for firm leverage indicates that the heavier was a firm’s existing debt load, the less likely was the 
firm to obtain increased loans. The estimated coefficients also indicate that larger listed firms 
were less likely to obtain an increase in bank loans, perhaps reflecting their better access to 
alternative sources of funds through the bond market, or perhaps reflecting less loan demand to 
the extent that these tend to be more mature firms. Listed firms with faster sales growth were 
more likely to obtain increased loans, consistent with such firms having a stronger demand for 
credit in order to increase capacity to meet the growing demand for their goods and services. 
Listed firms with a larger share of their assets in the form of property, plant and equipment were 
less likely to obtain increased loans.  
Each of the differential effects for unlisted firms compared to listed firms associated with 
firm characteristics, with the exception of sales growth and FPPE, also has a statistically 
significant effect, with the effect being of opposite sign with the exception of firm size. 
Moreover, the total effects for unlisted firms (the sum of the effect for listed firms and the 
differential effect for unlisted firms) differ significantly from zero at the 1 percent level for each 
of the unlisted firm characteristics (indicated by the “b” designation). The positive differential 
effect of ROA more than offsets the negative effect for listed firms, indicating that the total 
effect for unlisted firms is positive and, as indicated, differs significantly from zero. Thus, in 
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contrast to the results for listed firms consistent with banks evergreening loans, higher ROA 
increases the probability that an unlisted firm will obtain increased loans. The positive 
differential effect on the direction of the change in ROA for unlisted firms offsets most of the 
negative effect for listed firms, although the net effect remains negative. The positive differential 
effect on working capital partially offsets the negative effect estimated for listed firms, indicating 
that the net effect for unlisted firms remains negative, but is only about half as large (in absolute 
value). The positive differential effect on leverage more than offsets the negative effect for listed 
firms, indicating that the net effect for unlisted firms is positive. Thus, unlisted firms with greater 
leverage are more likely to obtain increased loans. The negative differential effect on firm size 
reinforces the negative effect for listed firms, indicating that smaller unlisted firms are even more 
likely to obtain increased loans. Finally, while the differential effects for both sales growth and 
FPPE provide a slight offset to the effects for listed firms, neither differential effect is 
statistically significant.  
With respect to the bond variables, BOND_D has a statistically significant positive effect 
for listed firms, indicating that firms with bonds outstanding are more likely to obtain an increase 
in bank loans. Listed firms that decreased bonds outstanding over the prior year were more likely 
to experience an increase in bank loans, and if outstanding loans decreased all the way to zero, 
the firm was even more likely to obtain increased bank loans. These two effects are consistent 
with banks replacing the credit to the firms as their outstanding bonds mature. Moreover, these 
effects are consistent with banks aiding weakened firms that are no longer able to access the 
bond market, insofar as firms squeezed completely out of the bond market are more likely to 
obtain increased bank loans than firms that merely experience a decline in their bonds 
outstanding. That is, listed firms no longer able to pass the market test enabling them to roll over 
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their maturing bonds return to their bank lenders that may not hold the firms to the same high 
standard as the arms-length bond market. On the other hand, when listed firms enter the bond 
market, with bonds outstanding increasing from zero, the bond issuance appears to replace the 
need for bank loans, reducing the probability of the firm obtaining increased loans.   
For unlisted firms, four of the differential effects are statistically significant, while three 
of the total effects for unlisted firms are statistically different from zero. Unlisted firms with 
bonds outstanding are more likely to obtain increased loans, although the effect does not differ 
significantly from that for listed firms. An increase in bonds outstanding by unlisted firms 
decreases the probability of the firm obtaining increased loans even more than for listed firms. 
The negative differential effect of a decrease in bonds outstanding offsets most of the positive 
effect for listed firms, although the total effect if bonds outstanding fall all the way to zero is 
stronger for unlisted firms than for listed firms. Similarly, the differential effect when unlisted 
firms enter the bond market offsets almost the entire effect for listed firms. 
The control for local economic conditions, the three-year average growth rate of real per 
capita income in the prefecture in which the firm is headquartered, has a negative and 
statistically significant effect for listed firms, indicating that a firm headquartered in a prefecture 
with a smaller value of PREF_INCOME is more likely to obtain increased bank loans. This is 
consistent with loans being directed to listed firms in the worst performing geographical areas. In 
contrast, for unlisted firms the positive estimated differential coefficient almost precisely offsets 
that for listed firms, indicating that local economic conditions had no net effect on the probability 
of an unlisted firm obtaining increased loans, once the firm’s own health and characteristics are 
taken into account.   
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Among the industry effects for listed firms, two of the industry dummy variables, 
CONST and TRANS, have estimated coefficients that are positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that listed firms in these industries are more likely (compared to the services industry 
which serves as the benchmark) to obtain increased loans. Only one of the differential effects for 
unlisted firms, that for TRANS, is statistically significant. The total effects for unlisted firms 
differ significantly from zero for three industries (manufacturing, wholesale and real estate), with 
the total effect being positive in each case.   
The remaining three columns contain alternative specifications that allow for the 
possibility of nonlinear effects emanating from ROA. In column 2, the continuous ROA measure 
is replaced by two (0, 1) dummy variables for observations in the highest quartile and the lowest 
quartile that indicate differential effects compared to the middle 50 percent of the observations. 
In column 3, the continuous ROA measure is replaced by (0, 1) dummy variables for 
observations in the top two and bottom two quintiles, with the estimated coefficients indicating 
differential effects compared to the effects emanating from the middle quintile. These 
specifications provide evidence consistent with the column 1 results and have no meaningful 
impacts on the estimated coefficients of the other explanatory variables.  
The column 4 specification allows the ROA effect to have a differential effect when 
FROA_AV is negative. The negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient on 
D_LOSS indicates that listed firms reporting negative earnings are less likely to obtain an 
increase in loans, providing a partial offset to the FROA_AV effect. However, the negative 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term of D_LOSS with FROA_AV reinforces the 
FROA_AV effect, although this differential effect is not statistically significant. For unlisted 
firms, the differential ROA effect is slightly larger compared to the column 1 estimate, but 
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neither D_LOSS nor its interaction with FROA_AV have statistically significant differential 
effects. The remaining coefficients, including that for DIRECTION, are essentially unaffected 
compared to those in column 1.  
 
5.2  Subperiods 
 The acute phase of the credit crisis (1998-1999) when several financial institutions failed, 
including the nationalization of two large long-term credit banks, may have caused banks to 
behave differently. In fact, the Bank Lending Attitude Diffusion Indices compiled by the Bank of 
Japan, containing responses separately from small, medium, and large firms, show a rapid 
worsening of banks’ lending attitudes in this period, as shown in Figure 4. An interesting 
characteristic of this episode of credit tightening is that all three types of firms experienced 
difficulties of a similar magnitude, whereas both prior to this phase of the crisis and subsequent 
to this episode the spread of the indices across small, medium and large firms was much larger. 
After major banks were recapitalized by two government capital infusions, the indices show 
sharp improvement, although small firms’ sentiment recovered more slowly than did that for 
medium firms, and much more slowly than for large firms. 
 Table 7 contains the results, using the continuous measure of firm ROA corresponding to 
column 4 of Table 6, for three subperiods: 1996-1997, 1998-1999 and 2000-2005. The first 
column of Table 7 contains the results for the 1996 to 1997 subperiod. Focusing on the set of 
firm characteristics, for this subperiod six of the seven firm characteristics for listed firms are 
statistically significant, with the lone exception being firm leverage. In addition, each of the 
significant coefficients is larger (in absolute value) than the corresponding estimate in Table 6. 
However, D_LOSS no longer has a statistically significant effect as in Table 6. Still, lower 
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ROAs and declining ROAs are even more strongly associated with an increase in bank loans, 
suggesting even stronger evergreening behavior by banks toward listed firms for this subperiod 
compared to the full sample estimates. Four of the differential effects for unlisted firms are 
statistically significant. As is the case for the entire sample, the positive differential effect of 
ROA for unlisted firms more than offsets the negative effect for listed firms.   
The second column of Table 7 contains the results for the 1998-99 crisis subperiod. 
Again focusing on the measures of firm characteristics, all but the leverage ratio and FPPE have 
statistically significant effects for listed firms. While the FROA_AV effect is now larger (in 
absolute value) compared to the 1996-97 subperiod, the partially offsetting effect of D_LOSS is 
now statistically significant. Only two of the seven differential effects for unlisted firms are 
significant, those for ROA and the change in ROA, with the differential effect indicating a more 
than offsetting effect for listed firm ROA.  
 The third column of Table 7 contains the results for the longer 2000-2005 subperiod. 
Again focusing on the firm characteristics, five of the seven effects for listed firm characteristics 
are significant, although those for both ROA and the change in ROA are now much smaller. The 
D_LOSS effect is significant and also is smaller than for the 1998-99 subperiod. Thus, while the 
evidence remains consistent with evergreening for listed firms, the magnitude of this effect 
appears to be much smaller subsequent to the 1998-99 crisis. Moreover, increased leverage now 
has a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that listed firms with a higher debt load have 
a reduced likelihood of obtaining increased loans. With respect to the differential effects for 
unlisted firms, four of the seven effects are significant, with those for both FROA_AV and LEV 




5.3  Main Bank Type Subsamples  
 Table 8 contains the results for two subsets of firms based on their main bank type. The 
first regression in Table 8 contains results for the firms with a City Bank as their main bank, 
while the second regression contains the results for the firms with a Regional 1 or Regional 2 
Bank as their main bank. For the explanatory variables of particular interest, the firm 
characteristics, the general pattern of the signs and significance of the estimated coefficients for 
the firms with a city bank as their main bank is similar to that for the combined sample (Table 6, 
Column 4). In contrast, some differences from the Table 6 results for the set of banks with 
Regional Banks as their main banks are apparent. However, the evergreening story remains 
essentially unchanged. While the ROA effect is somewhat larger (in absolute value) compared to 
that for City Banks, the offsetting effect emanating from the negative D_LOSS effect is larger, 
and the change in ROA effect also is smaller (in absolute value). Still, the unlisted firm 
differential effect for ROA is significant and more than offsets that for listed firms.  
 
5.4  Does firm size matter?   
 One systematic difference between listed and unlisted firms is that listed firms tend to be 
larger, on average, than unlisted firms. To address the concern that the results in the earlier tables 
might be related to differences in firm size, even though the log of real assets of the firm is 
included as an explanatory variable, the base regression from column 4 of Table 6 has been re-
estimated for three subsamples selected based on firm size. The three dimensions of firm size 
considered are total assets, total loans and the number of employees. The subsamples were 
chosen to include the range for which a major size overlap occurs for listed and unlisted firms, 
omitting both extremely large (predominately listed) firms and extremely small (predominately 
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unlisted) firms. For the log of total assets, the overlapping range is 15 to 18. For the log of total 
loans, the overlapping range is 13 to 17. For the number of employees, the overlapping range is 
100 to 1,000.5
 The first column in Table 9 reproduces the results from column 4 of Table 6 for ease of 
comparison. While the point estimates for the explanatory variables vary somewhat, the main 
story remains. For each of the subsamples, both firm ROA and the change in ROA for listed 
firms have negative and statistically significant coefficients, while the differential effects for 
unlisted firms are both positive and statistically significant, with that for the unlisted firm ROA 
differential effect more than offsetting the negative coefficient on ROA for listed firms in each 
instance. Thus, even when the extremes for any of the three alternative indicators of size are 
eliminated, the results suggesting differential treatment of unlisted firms with respect to 
evergreening bank behavior remain. 
 
   
5.5  Including IPO firms   
 An alternative approach is to include IPO firm observations in our analysis. The pre-IPO 
observations would be included with the unlisted firm observations, while the post-IPO 
observations would be included with the listed firm observations. A comparison could then be 
made between the pre-IPO observations and the post-IPO observations, as well as (1) between 
the listed firm observations for firms that are always listed and the newly listed post-IPO 
observations, and (2) between the unlisted firm observations for firms that are always unlisted 
and the unlisted observations for IPO firms prior to their listing. 
                                                          
5 These cut-off points were chosen to cover from approximately the 25th percentile of unlisted firms to 
approximately the 75th percentile of listed firms.  
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 The Table 10 specifications allow such comparisons. The first regression shown uses the 
listed post-IPO observations as the base and allows a comparison with both the pre-IPO unlisted 
observations and the observations from the always listed firms. For the post-IPO observations, 
six of the seven firm characteristics have statistically significant effects, with the lone exception 
being firm leverage. Of particular interest, both firm ROA and the change in ROA have negative 
estimated effects, consistent with listed firms more generally. However, the estimated effects are 
smaller (in absolute value) than those for listed firms in the earlier tables. Reinforcing this 
weaker effect, the offsetting effect of D_LOSS is now larger (in absolute value). Still, four of the 
pre-IPO unlisted firm differential effects are statistically significant, and all but firm leverage are 
of the opposite sign. However, the offsetting differential effect of ROA for pre-IPO firms is now 
only half as large as that for the post-IPO observations and not statistically significant. For the 
always listed observations, the differential effects for both ROA and the change in ROA are of 
the same sign and are statistically significant. Thus, it appears that the treatment by banks of 
newly listed post-IPO firms lies somewhere between that of their pre-IPO selves and the always 
listed firms.  
 The second regression shown uses the unlisted pre-IPO observations as the base and 
allows a comparison with both the post-IPO listed observations and the observations from the 
always unlisted firms. For the base pre-IPO observations, neither firm ROA nor the change in 
ROA has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of receiving increased loans. 
Consistent with the first regression in the table, the post-IPO listed observations have firm ROA 
and the change in ROA estimated differential effects of the opposite sign, with that for the 
change in ROA being statistically significant. On the other hand, neither firm ROA nor the 
change in ROA have differential effects for the always unlisted firms that are statistically 
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significant. Thus, it does not appear that banks treat the pre-IPO unlisted firms differently than 
they treat unlisted firms generally with respect to evergreening behavior based on firm 
performance as measured by a firm’s ROA.  
 
6.  Further Analysis of Listed Firms 
 It has now been established that unlisted firms have been treated differently by banks 
compared to listed firms. In particular, the evidence is consistent with banks being more likely to 
undertake evergreening behavior toward listed firms than toward unlisted firms. Moreover, even 
when we consider samples of listed and unlisted firms in the same size range, this difference 
remains. Thus, being a listed firm appears to matter.  Now we turn to better understanding what 
might underlie this bank behavior toward listed firms. 
 
6.1  TSE vs. Non-TSE Listings 
 The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) is the premier stock exchange in Japan.  An interesting 
question concerns the extent to which the favoritism shown toward listed firms by Japanese 
banks is reserved for TSE firms (essentially the A list), or also extends to firms listed on other 
stock exchanges. Table 11 contains the results from estimating the basic equation for the set of 
listed firms, making a distinction between firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (First and 
Second sections) and non-TSE listed firms. The first column contains results for the observations 
for the always listed firms, while the second column adds the post-IPO listed observations. The 
base group of observations is for the TSE listed firms. 
 For the always listed firms, shown in column 1, the TSE firms have estimated 
coefficients for the firm characteristics that are similar to those for the full set of listed firms 
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shown in column 4 of Table 6. The difference is that for all but sales growth, the estimated 
effects for the TSE firms are slightly stronger. Consistent with this comparison, the differential 
effects for the non-TSE observations are of the opposite sign from those for the TSE 
observations for each firm characteristic, with the exception of sales growth. However, the 
differential effect for ROA is significant only at the 10 percent level. Moreover, the negative and 
statistically significant effect emanating from the main bank market-to-book ratio also suggests 
the presence of evergreening by the weaker banks for TSE firms, although the offsetting 
differential effect for non-TSE firms suggests that this effect does not carry over to firms listed 
on minor exchanges. Thus, the evidence suggests that banks are less likely to engage in 
evergreening behavior with non-TSE listed firms compared to TSE firms.  
 When the listed firm observations are supplemented with the post-IPO observations from 
the IPO firms, shown in column 2, both the ROA and the change in ROA effects for TSE firms 
weaken somewhat, although they retain their significance. At the same time, five of the seven 
differential effects for non-TSE firms are now statistically significant. In particular, both ROA 
and the change in ROA have offsetting differential effects, with that for ROA almost fully 
offsetting the effect for TSE-listed firms. This evidence is consistent with banks being somewhat 
less likely to engage in evergreening behavior towards the IPO firms that list on the TSE, and 
even less willing to evergreen loans for firms listed on a non-TSE exchange. Finally, main bank 
health effects have a similar pattern as in column 1.  
 
6.2  Concentration of Bank Ownership of Listed Firms  
The extent to which ownership by banks of a firm is concentrated may provide an 
incentive for those bank owners to undertake evergreening behavior toward that firm. Such 
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relationships indicate strong bank-firm ties, as well as providing lenders with an incentive to 
delay or prevent the bankruptcy of a troubled firm because such an event would impact the 
lender’s own reported financial health. Thus, lenders with a substantial exposure to a firm, even 
if the lender is aware of the firm’s precarious health, may continue lending to the firm to avoid 
having to recognize any losses that would impact its own balance sheet were the firm to default 
on its loans or enter bankruptcy. Unfortunately, data on ownership and lender concentrations are 
available only for listed firms. Thus, we are able to supplement our basic specifications with 
ownership concentration measures only for the listed firms in our sample.  
Table 12 reports the descriptive statistics (mean, median, minimum, and maximum 
values) for the concentration of bank lending to, and bank ownership of, the listed firms in our 
sample. The number of lending banks, the Main Bank’s loan share, and the Top 3 lending banks’ 
loan share are from the Nikkei NEEDS loan database. The mean (median) number of lending 
banks is 8.61 (7), ranging from zero to 88 banks. The Main Bank and Top 3 loan shares are 
measured relative to the firm’s total loans outstanding. The Main Bank and Top 3 lender loan 
concentrations are, on average, 31 and 59 percent of a firm’s total loans outstanding, respectively. 
The shareholding data are from Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha. The mean (median) number of 
shareholding banks reported for the sample of listed firms is 4.73 (4), ranging from zero to 15 
banks. On average, Main Banks own 3 percent of the outstanding shares of listed firms, with the 
ownership by the Top 3 lender banks accounting for 7 percent of outstanding shares. All banks 
as a group hold, on average, 11 percent of the outstanding shares of a listed firm. While bank 
regulations limit a bank’s ownership to 5 percent of a firm’s shares, the table does show a 
maximum of 10 percent for Main Bank ownership. Due to bank mergers and acquisitions, bank 
ownership shares can exceed the 5 percent limit temporarily.  
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Table 13 contains the results for our sample of listed firms for the basic specification in 
column 4 of Table 6 supplemented with the ownership concentration measures for main banks 
and the top three lender banks. The bank ownership concentration measures are entered 
separately, as well as interacted with the four ROA-related measures, FROA_AV, D_LOSS, 
D_LOSS*FROA_AV and DIRECTION(FROA). The interaction terms are included because 
these measures of firm health have the greatest potential for indicating the extent to which banks 
are evergreening loans to the weakest firms. If banks are responding to the incentive to evergreen 
loans the more concentrated is bank ownership among the primary lenders to the firm, the 
ownership measure would be expected to have a positive estimated coefficient, and the 
interactive terms, other than for D_LOSS, would be expected to have negative estimated 
coefficients. That is, the more concentrated is bank ownership of the firm by the primary lenders 
to the firm, the more likely are banks to increase loans to the firm, and that likelihood should 
increase the weaker is the performance of the firm.  
The results in Table 13 confirm that greater bank ownership concentration, either by the 
main bank alone (column 1) or by the top three lenders to the firm (column 2), increases the 
likelihood of the firm obtaining increased loans. While none of the interaction terms for either 
the main bank or the top three lenders’ ownership concentration are statistically significant, that 
for D_LOSS*FROA_AV*Top3 Lenders’ Ownership is significant at the 10 percent level and 
indicates that the ownership effect is strengthened the lower is the firm’s ROA for firms with a 
negative ROA. Even with the addition of these interaction terms, both FROA_AV and 
DIRECTION retain their significant negative effects. Moreover, the market-to-book ratio of the 
firm’s main bank has a significant negative estimated coefficient in both specifications, 
indicating that the weaker is the firm’s main bank, the more likely the firms obtains an increase 
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in loans, consistent with evergreening behavior. Thus, bank ownership of unhealthy listed firms 
contributes to the incentive for banks to evergreen loans in Japan during the banking crisis. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 Because SMEs are more likely than large firms to be bank dependent, it is important to 
better understand the determinants of credit availability to SMEs. Moreover, because most 
studies draw conclusions based on evidence for only the larger, listed firms due to the 
unavailability of data for unlisted firms, those conclusions may be unwarranted for the great 
mass of firms that are most reliant on bank credit. This study addresses this important 
shortcoming of most of the existing literature, both by including a set of unlisted firms in the 
analysis and by investigating differences between the treatment of listed and unlisted firms by 
their lenders. 
 Our evidence is consistent with Japanese banks’ evergreening loans to listed firms, 
consistent with previous studies. However, we find significant differences in the way that 
Japanese banks have treated unlisted firms. In particular, the differential effects for unlisted firms 
for both ROA and the direction of the change in ROA tend to offset the evergreening effect 
found for listed firms. In fact, the total ROA effect for unlisted firms is positive in contrast to the 
negative effect found for listed firms; that is, banks are more likely to increase loans to unlisted 
firms the larger is their ROA.  
 While listed firms are, on average, larger than unlisted firms, size differences do not 
appear to be the source of the differential treatment. In addition to controlling for firm asset size, 
subsamples of listed and unlisted firms are considered with overlapping sizes of assets, loans and 
employees. Yet the evidence of differential treatment remains, suggesting that the special 
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treatment by banks may be attributable to a firm achieving listed status. Moreover, the 
evergreening behavior by banks toward listed firms appears to be stronger for those firms listed 
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the premier exchange in Japan, compared to other, less 
prestigious stock exchanges. 
 Interestingly, for the set of listed firms, we find that a higher concentration of ownership 
of a firm by either the firm’s main bank or the firm’s top three lenders increases the likelihood of 
the firm obtaining increased loans. Thus, it appears that lenders respond to increased equity 
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Figure 1.  Ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets for Japanese Firms (1975 - 2009) 
 
This figure presents the ratio of total debt to total assets for four different size categories of Japanese firms during the 1975-2009 
period. The data source is the Ministry of Finance, Policy Research Institute. Micro firms, small firms, medium firms, and large 
firms are defined by the size of their paid-in capital. Micro firms are defined as firms with paid-in capital of less than 10 million 
yen. Small firms are defined as firms with paid-in capital of more than 10 million yen and less than 100 million yen. Medium 
firms are defined as firms with paid-in capital of more than 100 million yen and less than 1 billion yen. Large firms are defined as 
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Figure 2.  Bank Loans to Total Debt Ratio (1975 - 2009) 
 
This figure presents the ratio of bank loans to total debt for four different size categories of Japanese firms during the 1975-2009 
period. The data source is the Ministry of Finance, Policy Research Institute. Micro firms, small firms, medium firms, and large 
firms are defined by the size of their paid-in capital. Micro firms are defined as firms with paid-in capital of less than 10 million 
yen. Small firms are defined as firms with paid-in capital of more than 10 million yen and less than 100 million yen. Medium 
firms are defined as firms with paid-in capital of more than 100 million yen and less than 1 billion yen. Large firms are defined as 
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Figure 3.  Bank Lending in Japan (1990 - 2001) 
 
This figure presents the trend of bank loans outstanding in Japan for four major bank categories (City Banks, Regional Banks, 
Regional Banks 2, and Shinkin Banks) during the 1990-2001 period. Bank loans for each year include total outstanding loans and 
discounts (including bills discounted, loans on bills, loans on deeds, and overdrafts) at the end of March. The Bank of Japan is the 
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Figure 4.  Bank Lending Attitude Diffusion Index 
 
This figure presents the Bank Lending Attitude Diffusion Index during the period of 1985-2010 based on a quarterly survey by 
the Bank of Japan for all industries. Firms are asked whether bank lending attitudes are moderate, not so severe, or severe in a 
questionnaire survey. The Diffusion Index is calculated as the percentage of firms that described bank lending attitudes as being 
moderate minus the percentage of firms that described bank lending attitudes as being severe. Until 2003:Q4, the size of firms 
was based on the number of permanent employees (small: 50 - 299, medium: 300 - 999, large: over 1,000). From 2004:Q1, the 
size is based on the amount of paid-in capital (small: 20 million - 100 million yen, medium: 100 million - 1 billion yen, large: 
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Table 1.  Number of Firms in the Regression Sample 
 
This table shows the number of each category of firms in our regression sample. TSE I (II) indicates being listed on the Tokyo 







Always TSE I 
listed





IPO to TSE I 
excl. upgraders







1996 907 344 637 0 13 162 7,692      
1997 915 349 625 2 10 114 8,126      
1998 946 328 614 2 3 100 8,317      
1999 934 333 585 4 10 67 8,563      
2000 938 333 497 4 16 93 8,699      
2001 954 328 472 13 16 148 8,813      
2002 946 315 455 6 21 109 8,598      
2003 901 285 430 6 9 112 8,880      
2004 874 269 393 9 11 98 8,828      
2005 882 245 362 12 14 141 8,191      
Average 920 313 507 6 12 114 8,471      
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Table 2.  Paid-in Capital and Total Assets 
 
This table reports the means, standard deviations, and median values for paid-in capital and total assets for our sample firms 
(excluding firms that moved from unlisted to listed status by IPO) at the beginning, middle and end of our 1996 – 2005 sample 
period. Paid-in capital and total assets are in millions of yen. Statistics for listed firms and unlisted firms are reported separately. 
 
 
Listed Firms Unlisted Firms
1996 2000 2005 1996 2000 2005
Panel A.  Paid-in Capital (Million Yen)
Mean 13,010    14,177    15,482    423        436        573        
St. Dev. 33,348    32,374    38,225    2,888     2,654     8,637     
Median 4,409      4,956     5,257     105        110        130        
N. of Obs 1,888      1,768     1,489     7,692     8,699     8,191     
Panel B.  Total Assets (Million Yen)
Mean 158,387  155,607  153,822  14,678    12,175    11,772    
St. Dev. 469,311  400,079  389,230  64,327    46,370    48,351    
Median 43,847    43,599    43,680    5,508     4,634     4,555     
N. of Obs 1,888      1,768     1,489     7,692     8,699     8,191     
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Table 3.  Industry Composition 
 
This table reports the distribution of sample firms across industry categories (excluding firms that moved from unlisted to listed 
status by IPO) at the beginning, middle and end of our 1996 – 2005 sample period. Sample firms are divided into seven industries.  





Listed Firms Unlisted Firms
1996 2000 2005 1996 2000 2005
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining 13         12         9            19         20         20             
0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Manufacturing 1,148     1,088     919        2,476     2,674     2,511         
60.8% 61.5% 61.7% 32.2% 30.7% 30.7%
Construction 160        151        116        1,396     1,612     1,360         
8.5% 8.5% 7.8% 18.1% 18.5% 16.6%
Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, and 297        272        227        2,540     2,770     2,540         
     Eating and Drinking Places 15.7% 15.4% 15.2% 33.0% 31.8% 31.0%
Real Estate 39         42         30          232        280        326            
2.1% 2.4% 2.0% 3.0% 3.2% 4.0%
Transport and Communications 113        98         93          385        434        422            
6.0% 5.5% 6.2% 5.0% 5.0% 5.2%
Services 118        105        95          644        909        1,012         
6.3% 5.9% 6.4% 8.4% 10.4% 12.4%
Total 1,888     1,768     1,489      7,692     8,699     8,191         
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Table 4.  Main Bank Type 
 
This table reports the distribution of main bank types for sample firms during the 1996 – 2005 period (excluding firms that 
moved from unlisted to listed status by IPO) at the beginning, middle, and end of our 1996 – 2005 sample period. Sample firms 




Listed Firms Unlisted Firms
Main Bank Type 1996 2000 2005 1996 2000 2005
City Banks 1,360 1,349 1,217 4,687 5,045 4,976
72.0% 76.3% 81.7% 60.9% 58.0% 60.7%
Regional Banks 209 196 187 2,482 3,042 2,844
11.1% 11.1% 12.6% 32.3% 35.0% 34.7%
Regional Banks 2 10 14 4 255 364 286
0.5% 0.8% 0.3% 3.3% 4.2% 3.5%
Long-Term Credit Banks 224 129 4 158 131 9
11.9% 7.3% 0.3% 2.1% 1.5% 0.1%
Trust Banks 85 80 77 110 117 76
4.5% 4.5% 5.2% 1.4% 1.3% 0.9%
Total 1,888 1,768 1,489 7,692 8,699 8,191
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports means, standard deviations, and medians for the variables in the regressions. The statistics are reported for 
listed firms and unlisted firms separately. Loan Increase (Dummy) has a value of one if total loans to the firm from financial 
institutions increased from the prior year, and zero if total loans to the firm were unchanged or decreased from the prior year.  
UNLISTED_D is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is unlisted, and equal to zero if it is a listed firm. FROA is measured 
as the firm’s operating income as a share of its total assets for the prior year. FROA_AV is the two-year average of FROA. 
D_LOSS is equal to one if FROA_AV < 0, and is equal to zero otherwise. DIRECTION(FROA) is measured as the difference 
between FROA and FROA_AV. Because of its small magnitude, DIRECTION(FROA) is multiplied by 100 for this table. 
FWORKCAP is measured as the firm’s prior year current assets less current liabilities as a share of total assets. FLEV, the firm’s 
leverage, is calculated as the firm’s prior year total liabilities as a share of the firm’s total assets. FLASSET is measured as the 
prior year logarithm of the firm’s total real assets, deflated by using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). FSALES is the change in 
the firm’s real sales over the prior year as a share of the prior year’s sales. FPPE is measured as the firm’s prior year property, 
plant and equipment as a share of total assets. BOND_D is equal to one if the firm has bonds outstanding, and is equal to zero 
otherwise. BOND_UP_D (BOND_DOWN_D) is equal to one if the firm increased (decreased) bonds outstanding during the 
prior year, and equal to zero otherwise. BOND_TO_ZERO is equal to one if the firm’s bonds outstanding declined to zero during 
the prior period, and is equal to zero otherwise. BOND_FROM_ZERO is equal to one if the firm’s bonds outstanding increased 
from zero during the prior period, and is equal to zero otherwise. MBK_MB is measured as the main bank’s prior year market-to-
book ratio. RECAP_D is a dummy variable that indicates that the firm’s main bank was recapitalized during the prior year. 
PREF_INCOME is measured as the growth rate of real income per capita during the past three years in the prefecture in which 
the firm is headquartered. Industry dummy variables indicate whether a firm belongs to agriculture, forestry, fishery and mining 
(AGRI), manufacturing (MANUFA), construction (CONST), transport and communications (TRANS), wholesale trade, retail 
trade, and eating and drinking places (WHOLESALE),  and real estate (REALEST).  The base group is the service industry.  
 
 
Unlisted (Obs = 84707) Listed (Obs = 17396) Entire Sample (Obs = 102103)
Variables mean st. dev median mean st. dev median mean st. dev median
Loan Increase (Dummy) 0.373 0.484 0.000 0.374 0.484 0.000 0.373 0.484 0.000
UNLISTED_D 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.830 0.376 1.000
FROA_AV 0.032 0.041 0.025 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.031 0.040 0.025
D_LOSS 0.135 0.342 0.000 0.136 0.343 0.000 0.135 0.342 0.000
DIRECTION(FROA) x 100 -0.035 1.760 -0.019 0.008 1.199 0.018 -0.028 1.677 -0.011
FWORKCAP 0.094 0.199 0.084 0.112 0.184 0.109 0.097 0.197 0.088
FLEV 0.748 0.196 0.789 0.596 0.192 0.606 0.722 0.203 0.762
FLASSET 15.385 1.212 15.349 17.686 1.381 17.558 15.777 1.514 15.620
FSALES 0.011 0.172 -0.003 0.002 0.118 -0.001 0.010 0.164 -0.002
FPPE 0.309 0.226 0.272 0.188 0.124 0.167 0.288 0.217 0.248
BOND_D 0.194 0.396 0.000 0.442 0.497 0.000 0.237 0.425 0.000
BOND_UP_D 0.066 0.248 0.000 0.130 0.336 0.000 0.076 0.266 0.000
BOND_DOWN_D 0.053 0.224 0.000 0.232 0.422 0.000 0.084 0.277 0.000
BOND_TO_ZERO 0.015 0.123 0.000 0.067 0.250 0.000 0.024 0.154 0.000
BOND_FROM_ZERO 0.032 0.175 0.000 0.037 0.188 0.000 0.032 0.177 0.000
MBK_MB 1.583 0.998 1.352 1.866 1.126 1.681 1.631 1.027 1.374
RECAP_D 0.062 0.241 0.000 0.029 0.169 0.000 0.056 0.230 0.000
PREF_INCOME 0.992 0.044 0.993 0.997 0.044 0.995 0.993 0.044 0.993
MANUFA 0.308 0.462 0.000 0.610 0.488 1.000 0.360 0.480 0.000
CONST 0.178 0.383 0.000 0.082 0.275 0.000 0.162 0.368 0.000
TRANS 0.051 0.220 0.000 0.059 0.237 0.000 0.052 0.223 0.000
WHOLESALE 0.319 0.466 0.000 0.157 0.364 0.000 0.291 0.454 0.000
REALEST 0.035 0.183 0.000 0.021 0.145 0.000 0.033 0.177 0.000
AGRI 0.002 0.049 0.000 0.007 0.083 0.000 0.003 0.057 0.000
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Table 6.  Regression Analysis for the Entire Sample of Firms (1996-2005) 
 
This table reports the results from random effects probit regressions for the probability of a firm receiving increased loans 
using variables intended to measure firm health, other firm characteristics, main bank health, and main bank type, as well 
as additional controls for loan demand and general macroeconomic activity. The dependent variable is the (0,1) dummy 
variable indicating increased bank loans. The basic specification is as follows:  
PR(LOANi t) = a0 + a1FIRMi, t-1 + a2BONDi, t-1 + a3BANKi, t-1 + a4YEARi, t + a5REGIONi, t-1 + a6INDUSTRYi, t-1 + ui, t-1 
FIRM is a vector of variables intended to capture firm health and other characteristics of the firm. The second set of 
explanatory variables, BOND, is a vector of variables intended to capture the characteristics of a firm’s outstanding bonds. 
The third set of explanatory variables, BANK, is a vector of variables intended to capture main bank health. The fourth set 
of explanatory variables, YEAR, contains a set of annual (0, 1) dummy variables. The fifth set of explanatory variables, 
REGION, contains PREF_INCOME to capture the average effect of regional economic conditions in each year. The sixth 
set of explanatory variables, INDUSTRY, contains industry dummy variables in order to control for any systematic 
differences across industries. The explanatory variables are interacted with the unlisted dummy variable to allow the 
effects to differ between unlisted firms and listed firms. See the Table 5 variable descriptions for the details of variable 
construction. All YEAR variables are included in all regressions, but the estimated coefficients are not reported to save 
space.  * and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients differ significantly from zero at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, 
respectively. Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate that the total effect for the unlisted firm variables (the sum of the listed firm 








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entire Sample Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value  
UNLISTED_D 0.043 0.11 0.086 0.22 0.076 0.20 0.035 0.09
FROA_AV -2.341 -5.85 **   -2.841 -5.69 **
D_LOSS    -0.109 -2.51 *
D_LOSS * FROA_AV -1.109 -0.71
DIRECTION(FROA) -0.080 -8.04 ** -0.079 -7.93 ** -0.079 -7.97 ** -0.080 -8.00 **
FROA_HIGH  -0.152 -4.92 **   
FROA_LOW  0.050 1.79   
FROA_QUI1   -0.168 -4.26 **  
FROA_QUI2   -0.043 -1.33  
FROA_QUI4   0.023 0.70  
FROA_QUI5   0.048 1.38  
FWORKCAP -0.859 -8.45 ** -0.862 -8.49 ** -0.859 -8.44 ** -0.861 -8.47 **
FLEV -0.374 -3.87 ** -0.362 -3.75 ** -0.365 -3.77 ** -0.381 -3.92 **
FLASSET -0.034 -3.13 ** -0.038 -3.48 ** -0.038 -3.49 ** -0.036 -3.33 **
FSALES 0.652 6.18 ** 0.629 5.99 ** 0.633 6.01 ** 0.656 6.21 **
FPPE -0.330 -2.59 * -0.325 -2.55 * -0.322 -2.52 * -0.337 -2.64 **
UN*FROA_AV 3.382 8.01 **b   3.613 6.88 **b
UN * D_LOSS    0.037 0.80 b
UN * D_LOSS * FROA_AV 0.890 0.55
UN * DIRECTION(FROA) 0.062 5.97 **b 0.060 5.83 **b 0.061 5.89 **b 0.061 5.93 **b
UN * FROA_HIGH  0.203 6.07 **b   
UN * FROA_LOW  -0.109 -3.59 **b   
UN * FROA_QUI1   0.239 5.62 **b  
UN * FROA_QUI2   0.099 2.75 **b  
UN * FROA_QUI4   -0.001 -0.03  
UN * FROA_QUI5   -0.106 -2.78 **b  
UN * FWORKCAP 0.362 3.35 **b 0.369 3.41 **b 0.362 3.35 **b 0.360 3.32 **b
UN * FLEV 0.640 6.21 **b 0.616 6.00 **b 0.621 6.03 **b 0.641 6.19 **b
UN * FLASSET -0.088 -7.37 **b -0.084 -7.05 **b -0.085 -7.09 **b -0.088 -7.31 **b
UN * FSALES -0.070 -0.64 b -0.036 -0.33 b -0.043 -0.40 b -0.072 -0.66 b
UN * FPPE 0.076 0.58 b 0.066 0.50 b 0.063 0.48 b 0.082 0.63 b
BOND_D 0.153 4.45 ** 0.152 4.44 ** 0.153 4.47 ** 0.150 4.38 **
BOND_UP_D -0.036 -0.80 -0.038 -0.83 -0.037 -0.81 -0.037 -0.81
BOND_DOWN_D 0.395 10.22 ** 0.396 10.26 ** 0.396 10.26 ** 0.396 10.25 **
BOND_TO_ZERO 0.277 4.86 ** 0.275 4.83 ** 0.276 4.85 ** 0.276 4.84 **
BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.226 -3.34 ** -0.224 -3.32 ** -0.227 -3.36 ** -0.227 -3.35 **
UN * BOND_D 0.065 1.70 b 0.064 1.67 b 0.063 1.63 b 0.067 1.73 b
UN * BOND_UP_D -0.115 -2.10 *b -0.113 -2.07 *b -0.115 -2.10 *b -0.116 -2.12 *b
UN * BOND_DOWN_D -0.350 -7.38 ** -0.351 -7.40 ** -0.351 -7.41 ** -0.349 -7.38 **
UN * BOND_TO_ZERO 0.168 2.29 *b 0.169 2.30 *b 0.168 2.28 *b 0.169 2.30 *b
UN * BOND_FROM_ZERO 0.196 2.54 * 0.195 2.54 * 0.198 2.57 * 0.196 2.55 *
MBK_MB -0.028 -1.96 -0.028 -1.98 * -0.028 -1.96 -0.028 -1.97 *
UN * MBK_MB 0.030 1.95 0.031 1.98 * 0.031 1.97 * 0.031 1.98 *
RECAP_D 0.030 0.47 0.035 0.53 0.034 0.53 0.033 0.51
UN * RECAP_D -0.130 -1.88 b -0.133 -1.93 b -0.133 -1.93 b -0.133 -1.93 b
PREF_INCOME -0.918 -3.06 ** -0.931 -3.11 ** -0.924 -3.09 ** -0.907 -3.03 **
UN * PREF_INCOME 0.921 2.80 ** 0.933 2.84 ** 0.926 2.82 ** 0.911 2.77 **
MANUFA 0.087 1.52 0.096 1.68 0.093 1.62 0.085 1.49
CONST 0.155 2.05 * 0.164 2.16 * 0.159 2.10 * 0.146 1.93
TRANS 0.207 2.65 ** 0.209 2.67 ** 0.207 2.65 ** 0.203 2.60 **
WHOLESALE 0.101 1.56 0.108 1.66 0.104 1.60 0.095 1.47
REALEST 0.143 1.34 0.153 1.43 0.148 1.39 0.137 1.29
AGRI 0.187 1.12 0.192 1.15 0.185 1.11 0.177 1.06
UN * MANUFA 0.026 0.43 b 0.011 0.19 b 0.015 0.24 b 0.026 0.42 b
UN * CONST -0.117 -1.49 -0.134 -1.70 -0.130 -1.65 -0.116 -1.46
UN * TRANS -0.168 -2.00 * -0.177 -2.11 * -0.175 -2.08 * -0.167 -1.98 *
UN * WHOLESALE -0.020 -0.30 b -0.032 -0.47 b -0.029 -0.42 b -0.020 -0.29 b
UN * REALEST -0.056 -0.50 a -0.068 -0.61 a -0.065 -0.58 a -0.053 -0.47 a
UN * AGRI -0.068 -0.33 -0.077 -0.37 -0.069 -0.33 -0.064 -0.31
cons 1.493 4.23 ** 1.505 4.25 ** 1.506 4.24 ** 1.562 4.40 **
Number of obs 102103 102103 102103 102103
Pseudo R Squared 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
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Table 7.  Regression Analysis for Three Sub-periods (1996-1997, 1998-1999 and 2000-2005) 
 
This table contains the results for three sub-periods: 1996-1997, 1998-1999 and 2000-2005. See Table 5 for a description of the 
individual variables. All YEAR variables are included in all regressions, but coefficients are not reported to save space.  * 
and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients differ significantly from zero at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate that the total net effect of a variable for unlisted firms differs significantly from zero at the 5 
percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
  
Panel A. 1996-1997 Panel B. 1998-1999 Panel C. 2000-2005
Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value  
UNLISTED_D -0.865 -0.90 -1.169 -1.43 0.289 0.59
FROA_AV -3.733 -3.50 ** -4.993 -5.07 ** -1.869 -2.76 **
D_LOSS 0.061 0.59 -0.190 -2.01 * -0.125 -2.17 *
D_LOSS * FROA_AV -0.579 -0.17 4.965 1.37 -1.872 -0.89
DIRECTION(FROA) -0.103 -3.89 ** -0.096 -3.86 ** -0.063 -5.05 **
FWORKCAP -0.895 -4.22 ** -1.062 -5.56 ** -0.707 -5.18 **
FLEV 0.028 0.15 -0.044 -0.25 -0.465 -3.57 **
FLASSET -0.096 -4.51 ** -0.062 -3.09 ** -0.022 -1.50
FSALES 0.835 3.08 ** 0.730 2.70 ** 0.531 4.03 **
FPPE -0.671 -2.70 ** -0.017 -0.08 -0.287 -1.65
UN*FROA_AV 4.091 3.58 ** 5.310 5.06 ** 2.729 3.85 **b
UN * D_LOSS -0.109 -0.95 0.125 1.21 0.045 0.73 b
UN * D_LOSS * FROA_AV 0.327 0.09 -3.518 -0.92 1.548 0.71
UN * DIRECTION(FROA) 0.060 2.17 *b 0.084 3.23 ** 0.049 3.76 **b
UN*FWORKCAP 0.354 1.55 b 0.338 1.64 b 0.237 1.64 b
UN*FLEV 0.609 2.88 **b 0.381 1.96 b 0.694 5.04 **b
UN*FLASSET -0.004 -0.17 b -0.028 -1.24 b -0.121 -7.68 **b
UN*FSALES -0.024 -0.08 b -0.181 -0.65 b 0.048 0.35 b
UN*FPPE 0.547 2.13 *a -0.306 -1.31 b 0.011 0.06 b
BOND_D 0.095 1.38 0.294 4.13 ** 0.112 2.27 *
BOND_UP_D -0.283 -3.13 ** -0.030 -0.30 0.127 1.94
BOND_DOWN_D 0.272 3.85 ** 0.378 4.42 ** 0.523 8.96 **
BOND_TO_ZERO 0.476 3.87 ** 0.241 2.16 * 0.192 2.26 *
BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.631 -2.88 ** -0.179 -1.19 -0.294 -3.41 **
UN*BOND_D 0.112 1.42 b -0.067 -0.84 b 0.134 2.47 *b
UN*BOND_UP_D 0.204 1.43 -0.064 -0.47 -0.304 -4.09 **b
UN*BOND_DOWN_D -0.150 -1.55 -0.414 -3.87 ** -0.487 -7.14 **
UN*BOND_TO_ZERO -0.133 -0.82 b 0.329 2.18 *b 0.278 2.63 **b
UN*BOND_FROM_ZERO 0.698 2.68 ** 0.034 0.18 0.261 2.73 **
MBK_MB -0.034 -1.41 -0.023 -0.78 -0.019 -0.79
UN*MBK_MB 0.010 0.35 a 0.010 0.30 0.038 1.51 a
RECAP_D  0.053 0.75 0.091 0.33
UN*RECAP_D  -0.140 -1.87 b -0.140 -0.49
PREF_INCOME -0.969 -1.25 -1.138 -1.64 -0.928 -2.51 *
UN*PREF_INCOME 0.166 0.20 a 0.907 1.22 1.082 2.64 **
MANUFA 0.097 0.93 0.149 1.51 0.033 0.44
CONST 0.293 2.09 * 0.158 1.19 0.059 0.59
TRANS 0.196 1.36 -0.012 -0.08 0.254 2.47 *
WHOLESALE 0.152 1.27 0.045 0.40 0.065 0.76
REALEST 0.091 0.46 -0.090 -0.49 0.216 1.54
AGRI 0.345 1.15 0.034 0.12 0.132 0.59
UN*MANUFA 0.056 0.49 b 0.094 0.88 b 0.038 0.47 b
UN*CONST -0.170 -1.14 a -0.171 -1.23 -0.038 -0.36
UN*TRANS -0.070 -0.44 0.130 0.88 a -0.270 -2.45 *
UN*WHOLESALE 0.044 0.34 b 0.016 0.13 -0.019 -0.21
UN*REALEST -0.095 -0.44 -0.015 -0.08 -0.067 -0.45 b
UN*AGRI -0.025 -0.07 0.384 1.07 a -0.191 -0.70
cons 2.562 2.93 ** 2.302 3.04 ** 1.043 2.34 *
Number of obs 19595 20620 61888
Pseudo R Squared 0.028 0.029 0.023
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Table 8.  Regression Analysis by Main Bank Type 
 
This table contains results for subsets of firms based on the type of their main bank. The columns of the table contain results 
separately for the subsets of firms with city banks and regional banks (I&II) as their main bank, respectively. See Table 5 for a 
description of the individual variables. All YEAR variables are included in all regressions, but coefficients are not reported 
to save space.  * and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients differ significantly from zero at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, 
respectively. Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate that the total net effect for the unlisted firm variables differ significantly from zero 
at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.  
  
Panel A. City Banks Panel B. Regional Bank I & II
Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value
UNLISTED_D 0.478 1.07 -0.245 -0.17
FROA_AV -2.828 -5.01 ** -3.374 -2.45 *
D_LOSS -0.100 -1.99 * -0.265 -2.31 *
D_LOSS*FROA_AV -0.203 -0.11 -0.880 -0.24
DIRECTION(FROA) -0.080 -7.02 ** -0.057 -2.08 *
FWORKCAP -0.705 -6.08 ** -1.386 -4.73 **
FLEV -0.179 -1.60 -1.167 -4.26 **
FLASSET -0.038 -3.16 ** 0.033 0.80
FSALES 0.615 5.01 ** 0.930 3.06 **
FPPE -0.167 -1.10 -1.725 -4.69 **
UN*FROA_AV 3.788 6.30 **b 3.665 2.61 **
UN*D_LOSS 0.016 0.29 b 0.205 1.73 a
UN*D_LOSS*FROA_AV 0.241 0.12 0.912 0.24
UN*DIRECTION(FROA) 0.063 5.24 **b 0.038 1.38 b
UN*FWORKCAP 0.267 2.12 *b 0.794 2.66 **b
UN*FLEV 0.429 3.54 **b 1.480 5.29 **b
UN*FLASSET -0.095 -6.96 **b -0.138 -3.28 **b
UN*FSALES -0.022 -0.17 b -0.360 -1.17 b
UN*FPPE -0.105 -0.67 b 1.480 4.00 **b
BOND_D 0.137 3.49 ** 0.238 2.34 *
BOND_UP_D 0.011 0.23 -0.182 -1.05
BOND_DOWN_D 0.416 9.62 ** 0.358 2.71 **
BOND_TO_ZERO 0.212 3.26 ** 0.647 3.66 **
BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.286 -3.67 ** 0.010 0.05
UN*BOND_D 0.085 1.91 b -0.015 -0.14 b
UN*BOND_UP_D -0.186 -3.04 **b 0.148 0.80
UN*BOND_DOWN_D -0.325 -6.04 **b -0.440 -3.07 **
UN*BOND_TO_ZERO 0.190 2.19 *b -0.047 -0.24 b
UN*BOND_FROM_ZERO 0.253 2.84 ** -0.121 -0.55
MBK_MB -0.023 -1.28 0.190 2.24 *
UN*MBK_MB 0.038 1.96 a -0.193 -2.21 *
RECAP_D -0.002 -0.03 0.142 0.59
UN*RECAP_D -0.109 -1.42 b -0.159 -0.64
PREF_INCOME -1.015 -3.01 ** -0.910 -0.79
UN*PREF_INCOME 0.783 2.09 * 1.266 1.07
MANUFA 0.091 1.41 -0.012 -0.07
CONST 0.125 1.48 0.054 0.24
TRANS 0.172 1.82 0.026 0.12
WHOLESALE 0.120 1.63 -0.196 -1.08
REALEST 0.207 1.73 -0.036 -0.10
AGRI 0.173 0.85 -0.525 -1.04
UN*MANUFA -0.001 -0.01 b 0.174 0.99 b
UN*CONST -0.116 -1.29 0.025 0.11 a
UN*TRANS -0.145 -1.41 0.055 0.26
UN*WHOLESALE -0.057 -0.73 a 0.312 1.69 b
UN*REALEST -0.044 -0.34 b 0.065 0.19
UN*AGRI -0.098 -0.39 0.781 1.43
cons 1.462 3.67 ** 1.167 0.83
Number of obs 63348 34862
Pseudo R Squared 0.032 0.030
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Table 9.  Regression Analysis for Firms with Overlapping Size Measures 
This table contains results for firms within size ranges for which a substantial overlap for listed and unlisted firms exists. In order 
to facilitate comparison, the result from specification (1) of Table 6 is shown as “Entire sample.” “Overlapping asset size,” 
“Overlapping loan size,” and “Overlapping # of employees” indicate the columns containing the regression coefficients for 
subsamples of listed and unlisted firms that have 15 < Ln(Assets) < 18, 13 < Ln(Loans) < 17, 100 < number of employee < 1000, 
respectively. All YEAR variables are included in all regressions, but coefficients are not reported to save space. * and ** 
indicate that the estimated coefficients differ significantly from zero at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Superscripts “a” and “b” indicate that the total net effect for the unlisted firm variables differ significantly from zero at the 5 
percent and 1 percent level, respectively.  
 
 Entire Sample (from Table 6, (4)) Overlapping asset size Overlapping loan size Overlapping # of employees
 Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value  
UNLISTED_D 0.035 0.09 0.642 1.06 0.262 0.54 0.300 0.52
FROA_AV -2.841 -5.69 ** -2.805 -4.61 ** -2.122 -3.83 ** -2.399 -3.82 **b
D_LOSS -0.109 -2.51 * -0.150 -2.94 ** -0.162 -3.31 ** -0.093 -1.74
D_LOSS*FROA_AV -1.109 -0.71 -1.114 -0.62 -3.046 -1.77 -0.815 -0.42
DIRECTION(FROA) -0.080 -8.00 ** -0.076 -6.40 ** -0.074 -6.47 ** -0.080 -6.43 **b
FWORKCAP -0.861 -8.47 ** -0.681 -5.34 ** -0.473 -4.07 ** -0.552 -4.22 **b
FLEV -0.381 -3.92 ** -0.295 -2.48 * -0.700 -6.28 ** -0.213 -1.74
FLASSET -0.036 -3.33 ** -0.100 -4.25 ** -0.134 -8.60 ** -0.057 -2.79 **b
FSALES 0.656 6.21 ** 0.748 5.73 ** 0.725 5.87 ** 0.730 5.41 **b
FPPE -0.337 -2.64 ** -0.313 -1.98 * -0.291 -1.97 * -0.305 -1.88
UN*FROA_AV 3.613 6.88 **b 3.578 5.48 **b 4.026 6.81 **b 2.448 3.65 **
UN*D_LOSS 0.037 0.80 b 0.115 2.00 * 0.136 2.55 * 0.030 0.50 a
UN*D_LOSS*FROA_AV 0.890 0.55 0.101 0.05 1.234 0.67 b 0.241 0.11
UN*DIRECTION(FROA) 0.061 5.93 **b 0.044 3.47 **b 0.049 4.10 **b 0.050 3.77 **b
UN*FWORKCAP 0.360 3.32 **b 0.042 0.30 b 0.091 0.74 b -0.007 -0.05 b
UN*FLEV 0.641 6.19 **b 0.552 4.27 **b 0.042 0.35 b 0.502 3.76 **b
UN*FLASSET -0.088 -7.31 **b -0.108 -4.16 **b -0.052 -3.04 **b -0.079 -3.55 **b
UN*FSALES -0.072 -0.66 b -0.143 -1.04 b -0.037 -0.29 b 0.049 0.34 b
UN*FPPE 0.082 0.63 b 0.016 0.10 b -0.242 -1.60 b 0.159 0.94 b
BOND_D 0.150 4.38 ** 0.156 3.74 ** 0.111 2.88 ** 0.161 3.74 **b
BOND_UP_D -0.037 -0.81 -0.258 -3.52 ** -0.121 -2.04 * -0.153 -2.17 *a
BOND_DOWN_D 0.396 10.25 ** 0.349 6.50 ** 0.361 7.69 ** 0.416 7.65 **b
BOND_TO_ZERO 0.276 4.84 ** 0.406 5.34 ** 0.326 4.80 ** 0.320 4.13 **b
BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.227 -3.35 ** 0.015 0.16 -0.118 -1.44 -0.107 -1.13
UN*BOND_D 0.067 1.73 b 0.031 0.68 b -0.012 -0.27 b 0.015 0.31 b
UN*BOND_UP_D -0.116 -2.12 *b 0.153 1.88 b -0.047 -0.70 b 0.012 0.16 b
UN*BOND_DOWN_D -0.349 -7.38 ** -0.139 -2.22 *b -0.228 -4.06 **b -0.187 -2.89 **b
UN*BOND_TO_ZERO 0.169 2.30 *b -0.108 -1.17 b 0.008 0.10 b -0.037 -0.39 b
UN*BOND_FROM_ZERO 0.196 2.55 * -0.054 -0.50 0.136 1.49 0.084 0.79
MBK_MB -0.028 -1.97 * -0.008 -0.45 -0.014 -0.86 -0.009 -0.47
UN*MBK_MB 0.031 1.98 * -0.004 -0.20 0.007 0.40 -0.008 -0.39
RECAP_D 0.033 0.51 -0.014 -0.19 0.022 0.30 0.001 0.02
UN*RECAP_D -0.133 -1.93 b -0.076 -0.92 b -0.145 -1.84 b -0.086 -0.98 b
PREF_INCOME -0.907 -3.03 ** -0.939 -2.46 * -0.884 -2.55 * -0.794 -2.04 *a
UN*PREF_INCOME 0.911 2.77 ** 0.799 1.91 0.751 1.98 * 0.619 1.44
MANUFA 0.085 1.49 0.159 2.40 * 0.051 0.82 0.054 0.79
CONST 0.146 1.93 0.251 2.60 ** 0.182 2.13 * 0.143 1.48
TRANS 0.203 2.60 ** 0.167 1.73 0.050 0.56 0.013 0.13
WHOLESALE 0.095 1.47 0.173 2.24 * 0.144 2.03 * 0.092 1.18
REALEST 0.137 1.29 0.031 0.18 0.190 1.18 -0.019 -0.13
AGRI 0.177 1.06 0.033 0.14 -0.104 -0.46 0.268 1.42
UN*MANUFA 0.026 0.42 b -0.037 -0.50 b 0.002 0.03 a 0.084 1.14 b
UN*CONST -0.116 -1.46 -0.217 -2.13 * -0.103 -1.15 b -0.081 -0.80
UN*TRANS -0.167 -1.98 * -0.116 -1.10 -0.027 -0.29 0.058 0.52
UN*WHOLESALE -0.020 -0.29 b -0.079 -0.94 b -0.048 -0.64 b 0.032 0.38 b
UN*REALEST -0.053 -0.47 a 0.082 0.46 a -0.109 -0.65 a 0.304 1.93 b
UN*AGRI -0.064 -0.31 0.236 0.84 0.214 0.83 -0.098 -0.39
cons 1.562 4.40 ** 2.516 4.58 ** 3.407 7.67 ** 1.667 3.21 **b
Number of obs 102103 61778 74083 54307
Pseudo R Squared 0.030 0.035 0.036 0.036
Number of Listed Firms 17396 10876 11992 10148
Number of Unlisted Firms 84707 50902 62091 44159
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Table 10.  Adding IPO Firms 
 
This table contains results for subsets of firms based on their listing status. The sample firms in Panel A (B) are always-listed 
(unlisted) firms and firms that underwent an IPO during our sample period. PreIPO_D is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the observation is from the pre-IPO period of an IPO firm, and zero otherwise. PostIPO_D is a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if the observation is from the post-IPO period of an IPO firm. In Panel A, the base is the IPO firms’ post-IPO observations. 
In Panel B, the base is the IPO firms’ pre-IPO observations. See Table 5 for a description of other individual variables. All 
YEAR variables are included in all regressions, but coefficients are not reported to save space. * and ** indicate that the 
estimated coefficients differ significantly from zero at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. For measures of differential 
effects, superscripts “a” and “b” indicate that the total net effect differs significantly from zero at the 5 percent and 1 percent 
level, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Always listed firms and IPO firms Coef. Z-value  Panel B. Always unlisted firms and IPO firms Coef. Z-value  
ALWAYS_LISTED_D -0.642 -1.09 PostIPO_D 0.692 0.74
PreIPO_D -0.832 -0.89 ALWAYS_UNLISTED_D 0.132 0.16
FROA_AV -0.926 -2.74 ** FROA_AV -0.338 -0.50
D_LOSS -0.208 -2.74 ** D_LOSS -0.143 -0.77
D_LOSS*FROA_AV 2.163 1.64 D_LOSS*FROA_AV 2.786 1.23
DIRECTION(FROA) x 100 -0.049 -5.91 ** DIRECTION(FROA) x 100 -0.010 -0.86
FWORKCAP -1.231 -9.67 ** FWORKCAP 0.093 0.41
FLEV 0.017 0.14 FLEV 1.277 5.22 **
FLASSET -0.115 -6.47 ** FLASSET -0.065 -2.54 *
FSALES 1.044 9.57 ** FSALES 0.831 5.35 **
FPPE -1.013 -7.31 ** FPPE -0.032 -0.19
PreIPO*FROA_AV 0.424 0.57 PostIPO*FROA_AV -0.530 -0.71 a
PreIPO*D_LOSS 0.076 0.38 PostIPO*D_LOSS -0.078 -0.39 b
PreIPO*D_LOSS*FROA_AV 1.044 0.40 PostIPO*D_LOSS*FROA_AV -0.512 -0.20
PreIPO*DIRECTION(FROA) 0.042 2.88 ** PostIPO*DIRECTION(FROA) -0.043 -2.96 **b
PreIPO*FWORKCAP 1.359 5.42 ** PostIPO*FWORKCAP -1.346 -5.34 **b
PreIPO*FLEV 1.229 4.64 **b PostIPO*FLEV -1.216 -4.56 **
PreIPO*FLASSET 0.041 1.41 b PostIPO*FLASSET -0.042 -1.42 b
PreIPO*FSALES -0.225 -1.20 b PostIPO*FSALES 0.220 1.17 b
PreIPO*FPPE 0.999 4.85 ** PostIPO*FPPE -1.033 -4.99 **b
ALWAYS_LISTED*FROA_AV -1.852 -3.11 **b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*FROA_AV 1.132 1.63 b
ALWAYS_LISTED*D_LOSS 0.098 1.12 a ALWAYS_UNLISTED*D_LOSS 0.072 0.39 b
ALWAYS_LISTED*D_LOSS*FROA_AV -3.225 -1.58 ALWAYS_UNLISTED*D_LOSS*FROA_AV -3.021 -1.31
ALWAYS_LISTED*DIRECTION(FROA) -0.035 -2.75 **b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*DIRECTION(FROA) -0.008 -0.62 b
ALWAYS_LISTED*FWORKCAP 0.371 2.33 *b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*FWORKCAP -0.599 -2.62 **b
ALWAYS_LISTED*FLEV -0.390 -2.55 *b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*FLEV -1.027 -4.16 **b
ALWAYS_LISTED*FLASSET 0.076 3.69 **b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*FLASSET -0.061 -2.31 *b
ALWAYS_LISTED*FSALES -0.365 -2.43 *b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*FSALES -0.251 -1.59 b
ALWAYS_LISTED*FPPE 0.677 3.79 **b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*FPPE -0.227 -1.37 b
BOND_D 0.156 3.21 ** BOND_D 0.085 0.96
BOND_UP_D 0.024 0.32 BOND_UP_D -0.029 -0.18
BOND_DOWN_D 0.119 1.71 BOND_DOWN_D 0.189 1.41
BOND_TO_ZERO 0.267 2.67 ** BOND_TO_ZERO 0.091 0.50
BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.070 -0.75 BOND_FROM_ZERO 0.063 0.34
PreIPO*BOND_D -0.052 -0.52 PostIPO*BOND_D 0.067 0.67 b
PreIPO*BOND_UP_D -0.052 -0.30 PostIPO*BOND_UP_D 0.042 0.24
PreIPO*BOND_DOWN_D 0.076 0.50 PostIPO*BOND_DOWN_D -0.078 -0.52
PreIPO*BOND_TO_ZERO -0.158 -0.77 PostIPO*BOND_TO_ZERO 0.176 0.86 b
PreIPO*BOND_FROM_ZERO 0.115 0.56 PostIPO*BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.131 -0.63
ALWAYS_LISTED*BOND_D -0.007 -0.11 b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*BOND_D 0.132 1.46 b
ALWAYS_LISTED*BOND_UP_D -0.059 -0.68 ALWAYS_UNLISTED*BOND_UP_D -0.126 -0.77 b
ALWAYS_LISTED*BOND_DOWN_D 0.273 3.43 **b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*BOND_DOWN_D -0.143 -1.04
ALWAYS_LISTED*BOND_TO_ZERO 0.010 0.08 b ALWAYS_UNLISTED_BOND_TO_ZERO 0.355 1.91 b
ALWAYS_LISTED*BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.155 -1.34 b ALWAYS_UNLISTED_BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.093 -0.49
MBK_MB -0.035 -1.94 MBK_MB 0.009 0.29
PreIPO*MBK_MB 0.060 1.69 PostIPO*MBK_MB -0.040 -1.13
ALWAYS_LISTED*MBK_MB 0.020 1.00 ALWAYS_UNLISTED*MBK_MB -0.006 -0.17
RECAP_D -0.215 -2.27 * RECAP_D -0.058 -0.50
PreIPO*RECAP_D -0.050 -0.34 a PostIPO*RECAP_D 0.027 0.18
ALWAYS_LISTED*RECAP_D 0.284 2.55 *a ALWAYS_UNLISTED*RECAP_D -0.054 -0.47 b
PREF_INCOME -0.203 -0.49 PREF_INCOME -1.479 -2.06 *
PreIPO*PREF_INCOME -1.104 -1.36 PostIPO*PREF_INCOME 1.236 1.52
ALWAYS_LISTED*PREF_INCOME -0.593 -1.22 b ALWAYS_UNLISTED*PREF_INCOME 1.524 2.10 *
MANUFA 0.114 3.14 ** MANUFA 0.119 6.15 **
CONST 0.157 3.06 ** CONST 0.044 2.03 *
TRANS 0.222 3.91 ** TRANS 0.058 1.92
WHOLESALE 0.116 3.04 ** WHOLESALE 0.086 4.42 **
REALEST 0.336 4.66 ** REALEST 0.135 3.99 **
AGRI 0.194 1.22 AGRI 0.118 0.98
CONST 2.081 4.09 ** CONST 1.436 1.74
Obs 27811 Obs 95122
Pseudo R-sq 0.048 Pseudo R-sq 0.028
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Table 11.  Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange or Not 
 
This table contains the results from estimating the basic equation for the set of listed firms making a distinction between firms 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and non-TSE listed firms. The first column contains results for the observations for the 
always-listed firms, while the second column adds the post-IPO listed observations. The base group of observations is firms 
always listed on the TSE (Section I or II, excluding IPO firms) for columns (1), and firms always listed on the TSE (Section I or 
II, including IPO firms) for column (2). YEAR dummy variables are included in all regressions, but coefficients are not 
reported to save space. * and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients differ significantly from zero at the 5 percent and 1 
percent level, respectively. For measures of differential effects, superscripts “a” and “b” indicate that the total net effect for the 
variable differs significantly from zero at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.  
   
(1) (2)
Coef. Z-value  Coef. Z-value  
NON_TSE -1.096 -1.32 -0.356 -0.60
FROA_AV -3.609 -5.34 ** -2.651 -5.22 **
D_LOSS -0.113 -2.11 * -0.094 -1.80
D_LOSS * FROA_AV -0.398 -0.20 -1.139 -0.60
DIRECTION(FROA) -0.093 -7.06 ** -0.090 -7.69 **
FWORKCAP -0.975 -7.83 ** -0.997 -8.39 **
FLEV -0.420 -3.51 ** -0.358 -3.15 **
FLASSET -0.046 -3.33 ** -0.057 -4.34 **
FSALES 0.579 4.25 ** 0.602 4.85 **
FPPE -0.343 -2.21 * -0.443 -3.11 **
NON_TSE * FROA_AV 1.959 1.72 2.570 4.29 **
NON_TSE * D_LOSS 0.030 0.32 -0.007 -0.10 a
NON_TSE * D_LOSS * FROA_AV -0.874 -0.26 1.670 0.77
NON_TSE*DIRECTION(FROA) 0.022 1.01 b 0.054 3.96 **b
NON_TSE*FWORKCAP 0.615 2.87 **a 0.361 2.29 *b
NON_TSE*FLEV 0.443 2.19 * 0.534 3.61 **
NON_TSE*FLASSET 0.060 1.91 0.015 0.72 b
NON_TSE*FSALES 0.240 1.06 b 0.333 2.21 *b
NON_TSE * FPPE 0.067 0.28 -0.069 -0.41 b
BOND_D 0.136 3.11 ** 0.146 3.46 **
BOND_UP_D 0.052 0.97 0.054 1.03
BOND_DOWN_D 0.429 9.05 ** 0.419 9.07 **
BOND_TO_ZERO 0.203 2.86 ** 0.210 3.05 **
BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.310 -3.72 ** -0.309 -3.83 **
NON_TSE*BOND_D 0.042 0.56 b -0.002 -0.03 b
NON_TSE*BOND_UP_D -0.459 -3.90 **b -0.195 -2.35 *a
NON_TSE*BOND_DOWN_D -0.072 -0.78 b -0.134 -1.87 b
NON_TSE*BOND_TO_ZERO 0.208 1.52 b 0.072 0.69 b
NON_TSE*BOND_FROM_ZERO 0.414 2.47 * 0.401 3.48 **
MBK_MB -0.050 -3.06 ** -0.037 -2.52 *
NON_TSE*MBK_MB 0.056 2.32 * 0.040 2.26 *
RECAP_D 0.064 0.76 0.087 1.07
NON_TSE*RECAP_D -0.095 -0.72 -0.243 -2.33 *a
PREF_INCOME -0.801 -2.15 * -0.588 -1.65
NON_TSE*PREF_INCOME -0.386 -0.63 a -0.297 -0.63 a
MANUFA 0.077 1.29 0.111 2.86 **
CONST 0.086 1.10 0.132 2.44 *
TRANS 0.184 2.35 * 0.227 3.76 **
WHOLESALE 0.051 0.75 0.118 2.79 **
REALEST 0.127 1.16 0.294 3.67 **
AGRI 0.138 0.85 0.164 1.04
cons 1.759 3.82 ** 1.632 3.74 **
Number of obs 15794 23664
Pseudo R Squared 0.052 0.047
N. of obs. (TSE) 11306 12295
N. of obs. (non-TSE) 4488 11369




Table 12.  Concentration of Bank Lending and Shareholdings for Listed Firms 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the concentration of bank lending and bank shareholdings for listed firms. The number 
of lending banks indicates how many banks lend to the listed firm. Main bank’s loan share indicates the share of the firm’s total 
loans outstanding that are held by the firm’s main bank. Top 3 banks’ loan share indicates the share of the firm’s total loans 
outstanding that are held by its top three lenders. The number of shareholding banks indicates how many banks hold shares of the 
listed firm. Main bank’s ownership share indicates the proportion of total shares outstanding owned by the firm’s main bank. The 
Top 3 lenders’ ownership share indicates the proportion of total shares outstanding owned by the firm’s top three lenders. All 




All Listed Firms mean median min max Obs.
Number of lending banks 8.61 7.00 0.00 88.00 16766
Main bank's lending share 0.31 0.28 0.00 1.00 16766
Top 3 lending banks' lending share 0.59 0.60 0.00 1.00 16766
Number of shareholding banks 4.73 4.00 0.00 15.00 16766
Main bank's shareholding share 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.10 16766
Top 3 lending banks' shareholding share 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.20 16766
All banks' shareholding share 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.49 16766
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Table 13.  Regression Analysis for the Concentration of Bank Shareholdings 
(Listed Firms Only) 
 
This table reports the results for the subset of listed firms. See Tables 5 and 12 for a description of the individual variables. 
Coefficients on the YEAR dummy variables are not reported. * and ** indicate that the estimated coefficients differ significantly 




Coef. Z-value Coef. Z-value
FROA_AV -2.830 -3.34 ** -2.475 -3.03 **
D_LOSS -0.081 -0.87 -0.113 -1.31
D_LOSS * FROA_AV 0.185 0.06 1.902 0.71
DIRECTION(FROA) * 100 -0.075 -4.18 ** -0.076 -4.51 **
FWORKCAP -0.772 -7.72 ** -0.757 -7.54 **
FLEV -0.359 -3.74 ** -0.342 -3.55 **
FLASSET -0.039 -3.72 ** -0.042 -3.97 **
FSALES 0.723 6.81 ** 0.718 6.75 **
FPPE -0.302 -2.43 * -0.261 -2.09 *
BOND_D 0.137 4.02 ** 0.135 3.95 **
BOND_UP_D -0.035 -0.76 -0.030 -0.65
BOND_DOWN_D 0.403 10.35 ** 0.406 10.43 **
BOND_TO_ZERO 0.262 4.56 ** 0.259 4.50 **
BOND_FROM_ZERO -0.218 -3.19 ** -0.218 -3.18 **
MBK_MB -0.033 -2.33 * -0.035 -2.43 *
Main Bank Ownership 5.584 4.65 **
FROA_AV x (Main Bank Ownership) 11.772 0.50
D_LOSS * (Main Bank Ownership) -0.671 -0.27
D_LOSS * FROA_AV * (Main Bank Ownership) -77.241 -0.96
DIRECTION(FROA) * 100 * (Main Bank Ownership) -0.265 -0.56
Top 3 Lenders' Ownership 2.757 5.25 **
FROA_AV * (Top 3 Lenders' Ownership) 1.015 0.1
D_LOSS x (Top 3 Lenders' Ownership) 0.044 0.04
D_LOSS * FROA_AV * (Top 3 Lenders' Ownership) -67.115 -1.89
DIRECTION(FROA) * 100 * (Top 3 Lenders' Ownership) -0.098 -0.46
RECAP_D 0.044 0.68 0.051 0.78
PREF_INCOME -0.893 -2.98 ** -0.903 -3.01 **
MANUFA 0.037 0.68 0.039 0.72
CONST 0.104 1.42 0.104 1.43
TRANS 0.178 2.39 * 0.190 2.54 *
WHOLESALE 0.060 0.97 0.061 0.98
REALEST 0.149 1.47 0.144 1.42
AGRI 0.107 0.67 0.117 0.73
cons 1.415 4.01 ** 1.426 4.03 **
Number of obs 16766 16766
Psuedo R squared 0.052 0.053
